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Abstract
This article discusses the judgment of the ECJ in Case C-240/09
Lesoochranárske zoskupenie. It argues that, in a globalised legal order, questions like
“who has the right to have access to justice” and “who decides who has access to justice”
are difficult to answer.
Introduction
In the 2010/2 issue of this review Jane Reichel – in her analysis
of the preliminary judgment given by the Court of Justice in the Djurgården-
Lilla Värtan case – illustrated that, particularly in the area of environmental law,
judicial control in a globalised legal order is a considerably complex area.1 The
Djurgården-Lilla Värtan case concerned the Swedish implementation of the
Aarhus Convention via an EU Directive, granting the right to access justice for
environmental non-government organisations. Even though the Aarhus Con-
vention and in that case relevant Directive 2003/352 both state that the right to
access justice is only granted to NGOs “meeting any requirements under na-
tional law”, the Court of Justice found that Swedish requirements were too re-
strictive. On the basis of this judgment it appears that it is up to the ECJ to decide
whether national conditions regulating access to justice are compatible with
both the Aarhus Convention and EU law, at least as far as it concerns the im-
plementation of Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention. The judgment in Case
C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, illustrates once more that a straight answer
to the simple question “who has the right to have access to justice” is not always
possible. Also, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie shows that even the question of “who
decides who has access to justice” in environmental matters is a difficult one.
Jane Reichel, ‘Judicial Control in a Globalised Legal Order – A One Way Track?’, REALaw
2010/2, 69-87.
1
Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 providing
for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating
2
to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice
Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC, OJ 2003, L 156/17.
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The facts of the case Lesoochranárske zoskupenie
A Slovak NGO (Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK (LZV) in
English: the WOLF Forest Protection Movement)3 requested that the Slovak
ministry for the environment inform it of any administrative decision-making
procedures which might potentially affect the protection of nature and the en-
vironment, or which concerned granting derogations to the protection of certain
species or areas. At the beginning of 2008, LZV was informed of a number of
pending administrative proceedings brought by, inter alia, various hunting as-
sociations. On the 21st of April 2008 the Ministry took a decision granting a
hunting association’s application for permission to derogate from the protective
conditions accorded to brown bears. In the course of that procedure it notified
the Ministry that it wished to participate, seeking recognition of its status as a
“party” to the administrative proceedings under the provisions of Article 14 of
the Slovakian Administrative Procedure Code. In particular, LZV asserted that
the proceedings in question directly affected its rights and legally protected in-
terests arising from the Aarhus Convention. It also considered that convention
to have direct effect. The Ministry however, argued that LZV did not have the
status of “party” but of “participant” or “interested party”. Prior to the 30th of
November 2007, Slovakian law (the second sentence of Article 83, paragraph
3, of Law No. 543/2002) gave NGOs the status of ‘parties to the proceedings’
to associations whose objective was the protection of the environment. These
associations had the opportunity to contest any decisions taken before the
Slovak courts. However, that law was amended with effect from the 1st of
December 2007. The effect of that amendment is that environmental associ-
ations are now classed as ‘interested parties’ rather than as ‘parties to the pro-
ceedings’. In practice, the change of status precludes those associations from
directly initiating proceedings themselves to review the legality of decisions.
Instead, they must request a public attorney to act on their behalf.
In its decision of 26th of June 2008, the Ministry confirmed that LZV did
not have the status of a “party” to the proceedings. LZV could not, therefore,
appeal against the decision of the 21st of April 2008. Moreover, the Ministry
considered the Aarhus Convention as an international treaty, which needed to
be implemented in national law before it could take effect. The court held that
Article 9(2) and (3) of the Aarhus Convention do not contain any unequivocally
drafted fundamental rights or freedoms which would be directly applicable to
public authorities. LZV lodged an action against the contested decision at the
Bratislava Regional Court. That court dismissed LZV’s application. LZV appealed
to the Slovak Supreme Court, which stayed the proceedings before it and referred
preliminary questions on the interpretation of the Aarhus Convention to the
See their bilingual website at http://www.wolf.sk/en/en-home.3
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Court of Justice. In particular, it wanted to know whether Art. 9(3) of the Aarhus
Convention is directly effective within the meaning of settled case law of the
ECJ.
Division of powers: who is the referee?
The competences of the EU in the area of environmental
protection must be regarded, also in the words of the Article 4(2) TFEU, as a
‘shared competence’. A shared competence implies that both the Union and
Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. How-
ever, the Member States shall exercise their competence only to the extent that
the Union has not already exercised, or has decided to cease exercising, its
competence. Thus, in the case of external environmental relations, there can
be no question of exclusive external Union competence. In that case, competence
is found with both the Union and the Member States and the conclusion of
such a convention on the environment should be effected in the form of a mixed
agreement, in other words, one to which both the Union and the Member States
are party. The Aarhus Convention is an example of such a mixed agreement.
It is clear from the case law of the ECJ that when a convention falls partly
within the competence of the Member States and partly within that of the
Union, it can only be implemented by means of a ‘close association between
the institutions of the Community and the Member States both in the process
of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the obligations entered
into.’4 The practice of concluding treaties in the field of the environment follows
this principle: the Member States have been parties to virtually all the conven-
tions on the environment concluded by the Union.
The conclusion of mixed agreements requires that certain matters must be
regulated with regards to the relationship between the Union and its Member
States on the one hand, and the other parties to the convention on the other. A
problem with mixed environmental agreements concerns the extent to which
the Union and its Member States are bound by them vis-à-vis the other contract-
ing parties. After all, mixed agreements are concluded because neither the
Union nor the Member States has exclusive competence. To what extent does
this internal division of powers affect the legal position of the other parties? Is
the Union only bound as far as third countries are concerned in respect of those
provisions that fall within its competence? To overcome these problems, most
multilateral treaties on the environment contain specific provisions on the
matter. With respect to the Aarhus Convention, the EC declared:
Opinion 2/91 [1993] ECR I-1061 (ILO-convention no. 170). Cf. also the ‘principle of sincere co-
operation’ mentioned in Article 4(3) TEU.
4
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‘[…] that the legal instruments in force do not cover fully the implementation
of the obligations resulting from Article 9(3) of the Convention as they relate
to administrative and judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by
private persons and public authorities other than the institutions of the European
Community as covered by Article 2(2)(d) of the Convention, and that, con-
sequently, its Member States are responsible for the performance of these obli-
gations at the time of approval of the Convention by the European Community
and will remain so unless and until the Community, in the exercise of its powers
under the EC Treaty, adopts provisions of Community law covering the imple-
mentation of those obligations.’5
This declaration of competence also raises the question of the ECJ’s authority
to interpret provisions of mixed agreements, in this case Article 9(3) of the
Aarhus Convention. Basically the question is, whether the ECJ itself or the
competent court of a Member State is best-placed to determine whether Article
9(3) of the Aarhus Convention has direct effect or not? The general rule on this
has been laid down by the ECJ in Merck Genéricos.6 In essence the Court held
in that judgment, that the jurisdiction to ascribe direct effect to a provision of
a mixed agreement depends on whether that provision is found in a sphere in
which the EU had legislated. If so, EU law would apply; if not, the legal order
of a Member State was neither required nor forbidden to accord to individuals
the right to rely directly on the rule in question.
With regards to the access to justice provisions of the Aarhus Convention
(the so-called third pillar), the EU adopted two measures. First, Directive 2003/35
that regulates access to justice in respect of decisions by Member States on envi-
ronmental impact assessment and IPPC installations. The preamble to that
directive, however, shows that this directive is intended to implement Art. 9
paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Aarhus Convention. Second, and with respect to
Article 9(3), the EU issued Regulation 1367/2006 dealing with access to justice
against decisions of the European institutions.7 In other words, the European
legislature has still not taken any measures to implement Art. 9 paragraph 3
Aarhus Convention with respect to environmental decisions by the Member
States. On the contrary, a proposal from the Commission8 to implement the
See Decision 2005/370/EC, Council Decision of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf
of the European Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation
5
in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. OJ 2005 L 124/1 and OJ
2006, L 164/17.
Case C-431/05 Merck Genéricos Produtos Farmacêuticos [2007] ECR I-7001.6
Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September
2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information,
7
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to
Community institutions and bodies, OJ 2006, L 264/13.
COM/2003/0624 final. – COD 2003/0246.8
90
JANS
access to justice provisions of Article 9(3) on a full scale via a directive is, polit-
ically speaking, ‘dead’.
A normal reading of the declaration of competence issued at the conclusion
of the Aarhus convention should have led to the conclusion that the EU has not
taken any legislative action towards their Member States to implement Art. 9(3)
Aarhus Convention. However, in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie the ECJ ruled as
follows:
‘31 Since the Aarhus Convention was concluded by the Community and all the
Member States on the basis of joint competence, it follows that where a case is
brought before the Court in accordance with the provisions of the EC Treaty,
in particular Article 234 EC thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to define the
obligations which the Community has assumed and those which remain the
sole responsibility of the Member States in order to interpret the Aarhus Con-
vention (see, by analogy, Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Dior and Others
[2000] ECR I-11307, paragraph 33, and Case C-431/05 Merck Genéricos –
Produtos Farmacêuticos [2007] ECR I-7001, paragraph 33).
32 Next, it must be determined whether, in the field covered by Article 9(3) of
the Aarhus Convention, the European Union has exercised its powers and ad-
opted provisions to implement the obligations which derive from it. If that were
not the case, the obligations deriving from Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention
would continue to be covered by the national law of the Member States. In those
circumstances, it would be for the courts of those Member States to determine,
on the basis of national law, whether individuals could rely directly on the rules
of that international agreement relevant to that field or whether the courts must
apply those rules of their own motion. In that case, EU law does not require or
forbid the legal order of a Member State to accord to individuals the right to
rely directly on a rule laid down in the Aarhus Convention or to oblige the courts
to apply that rule of their own motion (see, by analogy, Dior and Others, para-
graph 48 and MerckGenéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos, paragraph 34).
33 However, if it were to be held that the European Union has exercised its
powers and adopted provisions in the field covered by Article 9(3) of the Aarhus
Convention, EU law would apply and it would be for the Court of Justice to
determine whether the provision of the international agreement in question
has direct effect.
34 Therefore, it is appropriate to examine whether, in the particular field into
which Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention falls, the European Union has ex-
ercised its powers and adopted provisions to implement obligations deriving
from it (see, by analogy, MerckGenéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos, paragraph
39).
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35 In that connection, it must be observed first of all, that, in the field of envi-
ronmental protection, the European Union has explicit external competence
pursuant to Article 175 EC, read in conjunction with Article 174(2) EC (see,
Commission v Ireland, paragraphs 94 and 95).
36 Furthermore, the Court has held that a specific issue which has not yet been
the subject of EU legislation is part of EU law, where that issue is regulated in
agreements concluded by the European Union and the Member State and it
concerns a field in large measure covered by it (see, by analogy, Case C-239/03
Commission v France [2004] ECR I-9325, paragraphs 29 to 31).
37 In the present case, the dispute in the main proceedings concerns whether
an environmental protection association may be a ‘party’ to administrative
proceedings concerning, in particular, the grant of derogations to the system
of protection for species such as the brown bear. That species is mentioned in
Annex IV(a) to the Habitats Directive, so that, under Article 12 thereof, it is
subject to a system of strict protection from which derogations may be granted
only under the conditions laid down in Article 16 of that directive.
38 It follows that the dispute in the main proceedings falls within the scope of
EU law.
39 It is true that, in its declaration of competence made in accordance with
Article 19(5) of the Aarhus Convention and annexed to Decision 2005/370, the
Community stated, in particular, that ‘the legal instruments in force do not
cover fully the implementation of the obligations resulting from Article 9(3) of
the Convention as they relate to administrative and judicial procedures to
challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities other
than the institutions of the European Community as covered by Article 2(2)(d)
of the Convention, and that, consequently, its Member States are responsible
for the performance of these obligations at the time of approval of the Conven-
tion by the European Community and will remain so unless and until the
Community, in the exercise of its powers under the EC Treaty, adopts provisions
of Community law covering the implementation of those obligations’.
40 However, it cannot be inferred that the dispute in the main proceedings
does not fall within the scope of EU law because, as stated in paragraph 36 of
this judgment, a specific issue which has not yet been subject to EU legislation
may fall within the scope of EU law if it relates to a field covered in large
measure by it.
41 In that connection, it is irrelevant that Regulation No 1367/2006, which is
intended to implement the provisions of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention,
only concerns the institutions of the European Union and cannot be regarded
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as the adoption by the European Union of provisions implementing the obliga-
tions which derive from Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention with respect to
national administrative or judicial proceedings.
42 Where a provision can apply both to situations falling within the scope of
national law and to situations falling within the scope of EU law, it is clearly in
the interest of the latter that, in order to forestall future differences of interpre-
tation, that provision should be interpreted uniformly, whatever the circum-
stances in which it is to apply (see, in particular, Case C-130/95 Giloy [1997]
ECR I-4291, paragraph 28, and Case C-53/96 Hermès [1998] ECR I-3603,
paragraph 32).
43 It follows that the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of Article
9(3) of the Aarhus Convention and, in particular, to give a ruling on whether
or not they have direct effect.’
This is all very remarkable. As I have argued supra, the EU has not taken any
legislative action with regards to their Member States to implement Art. 9(3)
of the Aarhus Convention. Therefore, the ECJ should have abstained from giving
a ruling on the possible direct effect in EU law of Article 9(3) Aarhus Convention
and should have limited its jurisdiction by stating that it is for the national
courts in the Member States to determine whether Article 9(3) should be con-
strued as having direct effect subject to the conditions provided for by national
law.
The ECJ, however, took another view and decided ‘that Article 9(3) of the
Aarhus Convention does not have direct effect in EU law’. In order to reach
this conclusion, the Court started its reasoning by pointing out that the dispute
concerns the grant of derogations to the system of protection for brown bears,
a species mentioned in Annex IV(a) to the Habitats Directive. It follows, accord-
ing to the ECJ in para. 38, that the dispute falls within the scope of EU law.
Nobody disputes that the brown bear is protected by the Habitats Directive and
thus falls within the scope of that directive. But that was not what the dispute
in the main proceedings concerned, the dispute was whether or not the LZV
had a right to access the Slovak court and to challenge the ministry decisions.
As is well known, the Habitats Directive does not have any provision at all on
matters relating to the access to justice.9 The statement of the ECJ in para. 40
of the judgment is even less convincing. For almost every environmental dispute
one must come to the conclusion that ‘it relates to a field covered in large
This triggers the intriguing question of whether the LZV could not claim access to the Slovak
court on the basis of the principle of effective judicial protection as enshrined in Article 47 of
9
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Cf. Case C-279/09, DEB Deutsche
Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft, judgment of 22 December 2010.
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measure’ by an EU directive (there are more than 200 in all areas of environ-
mental protection). This inevitably means that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Con-
vention would almost always fall within the scope of EU law. This interpretation
makes the declaration of competence to the Aarhus Convention completely
obsolete and useless. Therefore, the Court’s assessment is, in the author’s view,
not correct. The ECJ’s mistake is that it looked at access to justice in environ-
mental matters as being auxiliary to the substantive standards of the Habitats
Directive. The Aarhus Convention shows that access to justice in environmental
matters is not just supplementary, but rather has a value of its own.
In its judgment, the ECJ also relied rather heavily on Regulation No
1367/2006. It assumed a competence to interpret Article 9(3) ‘in order to forestall
future differences of interpretation’. According to the ECJ “it is irrelevant” that
Regulation No 1367/2006 only concerns the institutions of the European Union.
With all due respect, that is of course relevant. Advocate General Sharpston
rightly argued:
‘It seems to me that the proposal for a directive to implement Article 9(3), which
has advanced no further, is particularly significant. I do not think that the Court
should ignore the absence of relevant Community legislation and allocate to
itself the competence to rule on whether or not Article 9(3) has direct effect. If
it does so, the Court will be stepping into the legislature’s shoes. But the legis-
lature has, thus far, intentionally chosen not to act.
Furthermore, the Declaration indicates that the Community considered that
‘the obligations resulting from Article 9(3) of the Convention as they relate to
administrative and judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private
persons and public authorities other than the institutions of the European
Community’ fell within the competence of the Member States; and that the
Member States were, and would remain, responsible for the performance of
those obligations unless and until the Community took action. That it has not
done so seems to me to be of crucial importance.’
Advocate General Sharpston therefore concluded in her opinion, ‘To my mind
a variation of the common law principle inclusio unius est exclusio alterius might
be applied here. Thus, the presence of a regulation applying Article 9(3) to the
institutions serves only to highlight the fact that there is no EU measure incor-
porating the equivalent obligations into the national legal orders of the Member
States.’ In her opinion, Sharpston makes a clear distinction between the juris-
diction of the ECJ to decide whether Art. 9(3) has direct effect in EU law (it has
not) and the jurisdiction to decide which court – itself or the competent court
of a Member State – is best-placed to determine whether a particular provision
has direct effect (it has).
The consistency argument used by the ECJ in para. 42 is, in the author’s
view, rather bold and not very convincing either. With this argument the Court
establishes a monopoly on interpretating the content of a treaty provision con-
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taining obligations for the EU Member States in a situation where the EU legis-
lature itself has not been able to give any substance to those obligations. This
is even more remarkable considering that Regulation No 1367/2006 has been
seriously critised in literature on the subject and there have been questions on
whether the regulation itself is even in line with Article 9(3) of the Aarhus
Convention.10 Furthermore, it is difficult to see why a ruling on the direct effect
of Art. 9(3) is necessary for avoiding ‘future differences of interpretation’
between the ECJ and national courts. If the Court, as suggested by Sharpston,
were to have abstained from giving a ruling on its direct effect because the
matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Member States, national courts could
never argue that the provision would have direct effect as a matter of EU law.
Directly effective provisions of international treaty provisions, as a matter of
EU law, would require that the matter does fall within the EU part of the decla-
ration of competence. Which is, as far as it concerns Art. 9(3) Aarhus Conven-
tion, not the case.
Direct effect of provisions in environmental treaties
concluded by the Union
The Court has acknowledged that provisions of international
treaties concluded by the Union could be directly effective, when these provisions
contain clear and precise obligations which are not subject, in their implemen-
tation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measures. This doctrine
has been applied with respect to environmental treaties for the first time in the
Pêcheurs de l’étang de Berre case.11 The case involved, inter alia, Article 6(3) of the
Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from
Land-based Sources. Under Article 6(1) and (3) of the Protocol, ‘1. The Parties
shall strictly limit pollution from land-based sources in the Protocol Area by
substances or sources listed in Annex II to this Protocol. [...] 3. Discharges shall
be strictly subject to the issue, by the competent national authorities, of an au-
thorisation taking due account of the provisions of Annex III [...].’ The Court
ruled that that provision clearly, precisely and unconditionally lays down the
obligation for Member States to subject discharges of the substances listed in
Annex II to the Protocol to the issue by the competent national authorities of
See G.J. Harryvan and Jan H. Jans, ‘Internal Review of EU Environmental Measures. It’s True:
Baron van Munchausen Doesn’t Exist! Some Remarks on the Application of the So-Called
10
Aarhus Regulation’, REALaw 2010/2, 53-65. Cf. M. Pallemaerts, ‘Access to Environmental
Justice at EU Level. Has the ‘Aarhus Regulation’ Improved the Situation? in The Aarhus Con-
vention at Ten. Interactions and Tensions between Conventional International Law and EU Environ-
mental Law (M. Pallemaerts ed.), Groningen 2011, chapter 10.
Case C-239/03 Commission v France [2004] ECR I-9325 (‘Étang de Berre’).11
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an authorisation taking due account of the provisions of Annex III. In the
Court’s view, the fact that the national authorities have discretion in issuing
authorisations under the criteria set out in Annex III in no way diminishes the
clear, precise and unconditional nature of the prohibition on discharges without
prior authorisation and that finding is also supported by the purpose and nature
of the Protocol. In conclusion, the Court ruled that in that case the provision
has direct effect, and therefore any interested party is entitled to rely on it before
the national courts.
In Lesoochranárske zoskupenie the ECJ denied any direct effect, as a matter
of EU law, of Article 9(3) Aarhus Convention and ruled as follows:
‘44 In that connection, a provision in an agreement concluded by the European
Union with a non-member country must be regarded as being directly applicable
when, regard being had to its wording and to the purpose and nature of the
agreement, the provision contains a clear and precise obligation which is not
subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent
measure (see, in particular, Case C-265/03 Simutenkov [2005] ECR I-2579,
paragraph 21, and Case C-372/06 Asda Stores [2007] ECR I-11223, paragraph
82).
45 It must be held that the provisions of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention
do not contain any clear and precise obligation capable of directly regulating
the legal position of individuals. Since only members of the public who meet
the criteria, if any, laid down by national law are entitled to exercise the rights
provided for in Article 9(3), that provision is subject, in its implementation or
effects, to the adoption of a subsequent measure.’
In my view, this conclusion of the ECJ is correct and not that remarkable at all.
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention provides that ‘each Party shall ensure
[…], where they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in its national law, members
of the public have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge
acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities which contravene
provisions of its national law relating to the environment.’ Compared to the
much more detailed and precise obligations under Article 9(2) of the Aarhus
Convention, it is indeed hard to see that Article 9(3) is directly effective.12
However the Court did not stop there. It continued by stating:
‘46 However, it must be observed that those provisions, although drafted in
broad terms, are intended to ensure effective environmental protection.
In the same vein Sharpston, opinion, para. 93.12
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47 In the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal
system of each Member State to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing
actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, in this
case the Habitats Directive, since the Member States are responsible for ensuring
that those rights are effectively protected in each case (see, in particular, Case
C-268/06 Impact [2008] ECR I-2483, paragraphs 44 and 45).
48 On that basis, as is apparent from well-established case-law, the detailed
procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under
EU law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions
(principle of equivalence) and must not make it in practice impossible or exces-
sively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness)
(Impact, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
49 Therefore, if the effective protection of EU environmental law is not to be
undermined, it is inconceivable that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention be
interpreted in such a way as to make it in practice impossible or excessively
difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law.
50 It follows that, in so far as concerns a species protected by EU law, and in
particular the Habitats Directive, it is for the national court, in order to ensure
effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU environmental law, to
interpret its national law in a way which, to the fullest extent possible, is con-
sistent with the objectives laid down in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.
51 Therefore, it is for the referring court to interpret, to the fullest extent possible,
the procedural rules relating to the conditions to be met in order to bring ad-
ministrative or judicial proceedings in accordance with the objectives of Article
9(3) of the Aarhus Convention and the objective of effective judicial protection
of the rights conferred by EU law, so as to enable an environmental protection
organisation, such as the zoskupenie, to challenge before a court a decision
taken following administrative proceedings liable to be contrary to EU environ-
mental law (see, to that effect, Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, para-
graph 44, and Impact, paragraph 54).’
Although Article 9 paragraph 3 of the Aarhus Convention does not itself create
a right of access for LZV, the provision is certainly not irrelevant. According to
para. 47 and following, Slovak courts have a duty to interpret ‘to the fullest extent
possible, the procedural rules relating to the conditions to be met in order to
bring administrative or judicial proceedings in accordance with the objectives
of Article 9(3) of that convention and the objective of effective judicial protection
of the rights conferred by EU law, in order to enable an environmental protection
organisation, such as zoskupenie, to challenge a decision before a court following
administrative proceedings liable to be contrary to EU environmental law.’ In
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other words, the Court is not only authorised to interpret Art. 9(3) of the Aarhus
Convention, but as a matter of Union law there also seems to be an obligation
on the Member States to interpret their laws in the light of the Aarhus Conven-
tion. I really do not understand this. I thought that in the absence of EU legis-
lation the implementation of Art. 9(3) Aarhus Convention was for the Member
States to decide? Regulation No 1367/2006 cannot help the ECJ here to bridge
the gap. So where does this duty of consistent interpretation come from: out
of thin air? The ECJ’s ruling makes declarations of competence like the one
declared at the conclusion of the Aarhus Convention, more or less irrelevant.
Once again, I would like to refer to the opinion of Advocate General Sharpston
where she stressed the importance of the absence of relevant EU legislation in
implementing Article 9(3) vis-à-vis the Member States. It could be argued that
the ECJ ignores the fact the Union legislature did not enact a directive imple-
menting Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. It seems to me that by creating
this duty of “Aarhus-proof interpretation” the ECJ might be stepping into the
EU legislature’s shoes, a legislature who has, thus far, intentionally chosen not
to act.
Furthermore, the distinction between direct effect and consistent interpre-
tation becomes somewhat blurred. On the one hand, the ECJ argues that Art.
9(3) of the Aarhus Convention is too insufficiently clear and precise an obligation
to have direct effect, but apparently, it is precise and clear enough to require
the Slovak to court to interpret its laws so as to enable an environmental protec-
tion organisation, such as the LZV, to challenge the Slovak ministry’s decisions.
If this analysis is correct, this can only mean that through the use of consistent
interpretation Art. 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention is applicable across the full
breadth of European (environmental) law.13 Furthermore, those environmental
groups should be allowed access to a court to challenge decisions that might
conflict with the environmental law of the Union. This would not only improve
access to justice for NGOs at national level, but given the consistency argument
in para. 42, would inevitably enhance the legal position of NGOs environmental
organisations at the level of the European court (s).14 There is no reason why
Cf. J. Ebbeson, ‘Access to Justice at the National Level. Impact of the Aarhus Convention and
European Union Law’ in: The Aarhus Convention at Ten. Interactions and Tensions between
13
Conventional International Law and EU Environmental Law (M. Pallemaerts ed.), Groningen
2011, p. 267 in particular.
Cf. M. Pallemaerts, ‘Access to Environmental Justice at EU Level. Has the ‘Aarhus Regulation’
Improved the Situation?’ in: (M. Pallemaerts ed.), The Aarhus Convention at Ten. Interactions
14
and Tensions between Conventional International Law and EU Environmental Law , Groningen
2011, p. 311 in particular. Cf. also the Aarhus Compliance Committee Findings and Recommen-
dations of the Compliance Committee with regard to Communication Accc/C/2008/32 (Part
I) Concerning Compliance by the European Union, adopted on 14 April 2011. The AAC held
that the case law of the ECJ regarding the standing requirements under the ‘old’ Article 234(4)
EC Treaty ‘is too strict to meet the criteria of the Convention’. And that ‘the Committee is also
convinced that if the examined jurisprudence of the EU Courts on access to justice were to
continue, unless fully compensated for by adequate administrative review procedures, the Party
concerned would fail to comply with article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention.’
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the ECJ itself would not be subject to the requirement “Article 9(3) Aarhus-
proof interpretation” of Article 263(4) TFEU. But whether the Court of Justice
wants to draw that conclusion and is ready to adjust its Plaumann doctrine15
remains to be seen!
Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission ECR 1963, 205Cf. on this case law extensively Hans Roland
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